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The objectives of the U.S. government’s European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA)—the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense—set out by President Barack 
Obama in September 2009 were modified over the course of his administration, which 
ended in January 2017. This thesis explores how U.S. interactions with Russia and the 
NATO Allies influenced the decisions on modifications made by the United States—for 
example, the cancellation in March 2013 of the EPAA’s projected fourth phase. The thesis 
finds that U.S. interactions with the NATO Allies and Russia played a role in revisions in 
the original objectives of the EPAA but were not the only contributing factors. Budgetary 
constraints, technological issues, and reassessments of threats also led to modifications in 
the EPAA program. Providing for the defense of populations, national territories, and 
forces remains a high priority for the United States and its NATO Allies, and the Alliance 
has repeatedly sought dialogue and cooperation with Russia concerning missile defense. 
Events have vindicated the EPAA’s design for adaptability to benefit from technological 
innovations and to meet the evolving needs for Alliance protection in the international 
security environment.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The original objectives of the U.S. government’s European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA)—the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense—were modified in 
the course of the program’s pursuit from September 2009 until the end of the Obama 
administration in January 2017. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that interactions 
with Russia and the NATO allies influenced the decisions on modifications made by the 
United States—e.g., the cancellation in March 2013 of the projected fourth phase of the 
EPAA. It examines the original plan of the United States for the EPAA and how it was 
ultimately implemented. How did the responses of the NATO Allies shape their national 
and collective contributions to the Alliance missile defense posture and ultimately affect 
the original objectives of the EPAA? How did Russia’s reactions to the evolving EPAA 
program influence its implementation? What are the ramifications for NATO as a result of 
Russia’s criticisms and attempts to shape the program? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
NATO is the oldest, largest, and most important multilateral U.S. alliance. Missile 
capabilities that threaten the Alliance also endanger U.S. forces, assets, and interests. A 
collective NATO missile defense architecture protects not only the NATO Allies’ territory 
and people but also U.S. troops and assets. The Obama administration instituted the EPAA 
program with the intent to deploy a BMD system that could be adapted to changing missile 
threats.1 While countering prospective missile threats was the biggest concern, it appears 
that the Obama administration did not accurately estimate changes in the threat 
environment (notably with regard to Iran and North Korea), the actual time line for the 
EPAA’s development and deployment, or the reactions of Russia and the NATO Allies. 
The evolving international security environment may have been one of the factors that led 
                                                 
1 Roger Handberg, “The Symbolic Politics of Ballistic Missile Defense: Seeking the Perfect Defense 
in an Imperfect World,” Defense & Security Analysis 31, no. 1 (2015): 49, doi: 
10.1080/14751798.2014.995336. 
 2 
the Obama administration to cancel the fourth phase of the EPAA, and critics argue that 
the EPAA has fallen short of the original intent.  
With a new administration in the United States since January 2017, that of President 
Donald Trump, Washington may soon define further changes in U.S. missile defense 
policies. In 2010, the NATO Allies decided to expand the Alliance BMD program, largely 
because the United States agreed to provide most of the required equipment (including 
sensors and interceptors).2 The Allies defined the purpose of NATO missile defense as 
follows in the 2010 Strategic Concept:  
We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to 
deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our 
populations. Therefore, we will: . . . develop the capability to defend our 
populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element 
of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the 
Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia 
and other Euro-Atlantic partners.3  
The goal of NATO missile defense is not only to deter but also to defend against current 
and future threats. Missile defense adds security to the Alliance by making the Allies and 
the cooperation between them more secure and inseparable. What threatens one NATO 
Ally threatens all members of the NATO Alliance. 
The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) in May 2012 also 
commented on the functions of NATO missile defense. According to the DDPR,  
It is expected that NATO’s missile defence capabilities would complicate 
an adversary’s planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile 
defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like 
other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise 
complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, 
along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our 
                                                 
2 Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2013), 1. 
3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the 
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State 
and Government in Lisbon, (Lisbon, Portugal: 2010), par. 19, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. 
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determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-
Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.4 
This passage in the DDPR explains the benefits of NATO missile defense capabilities as 
well as their limitations in the realm of “complete and enduring effectiveness.”  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature focuses on the examination of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) program that was instituted under the Obama administration. The 
primary sources for this topic include U.S. government documents and NATO 
communiqués and other Alliance statements as well as Russian policy declarations. The 
secondary sources, including works published in scholarly journals and newspapers, 
complement the evidence found in the primary sources.  
1. Obama Administration Policy and Revisions  
The Obama Administration announced the European Phased Adaptive Approach to 
replace the previous administration’s system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) interceptors. President Obama characterized the EPAA by saying, “To put it 
simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and 
swifter defenses of American forces and America’s allies.”5 In other words, the Obama 
administration believed that the EPAA would be more capable of protecting American 
forces and interests than the system that had been under development by the previous 
administration.  
The 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit carried forward the dialogue among the Allies 
about the EPAA. The administration had already gained the support of the NATO Allies it 
desired. President Obama first announced the EPAA program in September 2009 and 
stated, following a meeting with the NATO security general that “we also discussed missile 
                                                 
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, (2012), par. 20, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm. 




defense, and we both agreed that the configuration that we have proposed is one that, 
ultimately, will serve the interests of not only the United States but also NATO alliance 
members most effectively.”6 This shows the priority of the United States and the other 
NATO Allies to pursue a collective plan of missile defense to protect their interests in 
Europe and North America. President Obama further stated, “It allows for a full 
collaboration with NATO members, and we are very optimistic that it will achieve our aims 
and deal with the very real threat of ballistic missiles.”7 This shows the optimism and “buy 
in” concerning the collective goal of the NATO Allies, including the United States.  
President Obama initially revealed his plan to the American people on September 
17, 2009. Just over a year later, he wrote a letter to the Senate Leadership, which included 
the following statement: “My administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA. 
While advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or 
timing of the later phases of the EPAA—one reason this approach is called ‘adaptive’—I 
will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four phases.”8 This 
declaration shows the intention to complete the EPAA phases as originally planned. Over 
two years later, in March 2013, the Obama Administration announced the restructuring of 
the plan, including the cancellation of Phase 4.  
In March 2013, Chuck Hagel, then the Secretary of Defense, announced the 
cancellation of the fourth phase of the EPAA. He said that the cancellation of the phase 
was due to a restructuring of the program on the part of the administration. He reaffirmed 
that the phases in place would protect the European NATO Allies. He said, “Let me 
emphasize the strong and continued commitment of the United States to NATO missile 
defense. That commitment remains ironclad. The missile deployments the United States is 
making in phases one through three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including 
                                                 
6 Barack Obama, “Remarks Following a Meeting with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,” September 29, 2009. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2009-
book2/pdf/PPP-2009-book2-Doc-pg1464.pdf. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Barack Obama, “Letter to Senate Leadership on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Missile 
Defense,” December 18, 2010. Accessed February 08, 2018. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=88850. 
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sites in Poland and Romania, will be able to provide coverage of all European NATO 
territory as planned by 2018.”9 This statement suggests that the first three phases will 
provide adequate protection of the NATO territory in Europe. It also suggests that the 
fourth phase would not have provided substantial additional protection for Europe, because 
it was intended to protect North America from ICBMs, as well as improving the system’s 
ability to counter medium—and intermediate—range missiles.  
2. Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) was a ten-month review by 
the Department of Defense that assessed the threats to the United States and its Allies as 
well as the strategy and policy priorities of the Obama Administration. The Secretary of 
Defense presented the BMDR report to Congress on February 1, 2010. According to the 
report fact sheet, “The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) is a review 
conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, while 
also addressing the legislative requirement to assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy 
and strategy.”10 The review was the first of its kind and pursued the goal of examining the 
U.S. BMD policy not only in Europe but in all geographical areas of operation.  
While reviewing the policy of the United States, U.S. policy makers also needed to 
take into account the efforts and inputs of U.S. Allies. The BMDR report stated, “The 
Administration recognizes that allies do not view the specifics of the missile threat in the 
same way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, but there is general 
recognition of a growing threat and the need to take steps now to address both existing 
threats and emerging ones.”11 The review acknowledged that the resources and 
                                                 
9 Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon,” 
March 15, 2013, Accessed February 13, 2018. 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5205. 
10 Department of Defense, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Fact Sheet, (Department of 
Defense Office of Public Affairs, 2010), 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/BMDR/BMDR_FACT_SHEET_March_2010
_Final.pdf. 
11 Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical 
Information Center, 2010), 32. 
 6 
requirements of the United States were different from those of its allies. This aspect is seen 
clearly in the EPAA: The United States has covered the bulk of the costs regarding 
equipment while its NATO Allies are collectively covering the command and control 
aspects.  
The defense of U.S. troops, interests, and Allies in Europe is an important aspect 
of the EPAA plan, but U.S. homeland defense also remains at the forefront. The review 
specifically considered the individual phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
and what the United States hoped to accomplish with it. The most interesting aspect of the 
review of the individual phases concerns Phase 4, which would be canceled in March 2013. 
The review stated, “In the European Phased Adaptive Approach, for example, Phase 4 
explicitly envisages additional capabilities that can be added to the European architecture 
to improve on the current defense of the homeland.”12 This is an interesting statement 
because it indicates that Phase 4 was intended to improve the defense of the continental 
United States. When this phase of the program was canceled, Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel stated, “As many of you know, we had planned to deploy the SM-3 IIB as part of 
the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The purpose was to add to the protection of the 
U.S. homeland already provided by our current GBIs against missile threats from the 
Middle East.”13  
Hagel stated that Phase 4 was being canceled due to sufficient protection provided 
by current GBIs. He added, “By shifting resources from this lagging program to fund the 
additional GBIs as well as advance-kill vehicle technology that will improve the 
performance of the GBI and other versions of the SM-3 interceptor we will be able to add 
protection against missiles from Iran sooner, while also providing additional protection 
against the North Korean threat.”14 His statement implied that the program had fallen 
behind its original objectives as initially stated by the Obama Administration in September 
2009 and in the BMDR in 2010. Therefore, the Obama administration needed to reprioritize 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 27. 
13 Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon.” 
14 Ibid. 
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what was most important to the United States regarding the continuation of the EPAA for 
the defense of the United States and its Allies.  
The BMDR also reinforced the advantage of having a policy that was flexible 
enough to accommodate changes regarding technologies, threats, allied contributions, and 
other factors. In the words of the BMDR report, “One of the benefits of the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach is that it allows for a Russian contribution if political 
circumstances make that possible. For example, Russian radars could contribute useful and 
welcome tracking data, although the functioning of the U.S. system will not be dependent 
on that data.”15 This excerpt from the report shows the adaptation that is possible with the 
program in the way that it was originally written. It allows for multilateral cooperation 
involving the NATO Allies as well as Russia. This also indicates that the system was not 
intended for use against the Russians, despite Moscow’s claims.  
3. 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration  
NATO missile defense is a relatively new decision with a long history leading to 
the endorsement of full coverage collective missile defense of NATO territory, 
populations, and forces at the 2010 Lisbon Summit.16 The Lisbon Summit Declaration 
stated that  
The aim of a NATO missile defense capability is to provide full coverage 
and protection of all NATO European populations, territory and forces 
against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, 
based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO 
solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens as well as reasonable 
challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability and technical 
feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments 
agreed by the Alliance.17  
                                                 
15 Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 34. 
16 Alexander Vershbow, “NATO and Missile Defence,” 12 June 2013, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_101397.htm.  
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon Summit Declaration, (Lisbon, Portugal, 2010), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. Par. 36 and 37. 
 8 
The aim articulated at the Lisbon Summit clearly stated that the Allies would contribute 
what they were able to, based on “the level of threat, affordability, and technical 
feasibility.” This shows that the discussion on limitations and feasibility was brought to the 
table from the beginning. From this summit also came the following declaration: “In this 
context, the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable 
national contribution to the NATO missile defence architecture, as are other possible 
voluntary contributions by Allies.”18 The EPAA remains the U.S. contribution to the 
combined NATO missile defense architecture. The NATO Allies acknowledged that while 
the United States contribution was welcome and valuable, so also are the contributions 
provided by other NATO members. In October 2009, a month after the initial U.S. 
announcement about the EPAA, Rasa Jukneviciene, the Lithuanian Minister of Defense, 
said that 
The recently announced changes to the original U.S. plan for missile 
defence in Europe were originally mistaken in some capitals for a sign of 
the U.S. losing interest in the security of Europe and making concessions to 
Russia. As the U.S. has shared more details about the new design of the 
system, we are satisfied to see that, if anything, the system will become 
more robust, technically advanced, mobile and adaptive to threats. The U.S. 
is committed to building the system and to place some of its elements in 
Europe. To me, it means that the U.S. is as committed to our security as ever 
and, rather than making concessions to Russia’s unreasonable demands, it 
opens new opportunities for cooperation with Russia in credibly addressing 
a serious growing threat.19 
4. Russian Views 
Russia has been opposed to the United States contribution to the NATO missile 
defense posture as well as to the system architecture as a whole. Since the September 2009 
U.S. announcement of the EPAA, Russia has opposed the program and has claimed that it 
threatens Moscow’s strategic deterrent. The Russians have asserted that the system is not 
being developed and deployed just to counter the Iranian threat but rather also to provide 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Rasa Jukneviciene, “Latest Developments in European Security: A Baltic Perspective,” (London: 
Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 20 October 2009): 3. [Minister of Defense of 
Lithuania, 2008–2012] 
 9 
first strike opportunities against Russia. In February 2009, before the announcement of the 
EPAA, Dmitry Rogozin condemned U.S.-led missile defense efforts in NATO Europe: 
The missile defence system is aimed at Russia, not Iran. We suggested to 
the US that we could develop a common missile defence system and the 
radar system in Gabala, Azerbaijan. This system could detect missiles from 
the moment of launch, and would include our modern monitoring station in 
Rostov Oblast. This met with a flat refusal. Next, we suggested that the 
monitoring station in the Czech Republic be built in such a way that the 
angle of the radar sweep is limited and doesn’t look eastward over Russia. 
Again we were rebuffed. They refused to allow us to inspect the facility. 
We asked that the facility be turned off in times of peace, this was also 
ignored. How was Russia supposed to act in such a situation? Russia has 
offered to provide confidence building measures. The competitive 
development of defence technology eventually spills out into an offensive 
arms race.20 
This statement conveys the Russian policy line—that the Russians approached the United 
States and NATO as a whole with their concerns, and that their views were dismissed by 
the Alliance. As this statement suggests, the Russians have also argued that the attempt by 
the NATO Allies to build a missile defense system is fostering an arms race among nations.  
Russia has expressed many views critical of the expansion of NATO’s missile 
defense and the impact on Russia as a result. President Vladimir Putin in 2012 advanced 
the following opinion regarding the expansion of NATO’s missile defense: “Everyone 
understands what I am referring to—an expansion of NATO that includes the deployment 
of new military infrastructure with its US-drafted plans to establish a missile defence 
system in Europe. I would not touch on this issue if these plans were not conducted in close 
proximity to Russian borders, if they did not undermine our security and global stability in 
general.”21 This statement by Putin once again emphasizes Russia’s discontent with 
NATO missile defense in Europe and its contention that it threatens Russian security and 
global stability. The emphasis on proximity to Russia’s borders may derive from the 
facilities under construction in both Deveselu, Romania, and Redzikowo, Poland. Russia’s 
                                                 
20 Dmitry Rogozin, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of European Security,” (London: Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Chatham House, 20 February 2009).  
21 Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” in English on the Russian Prime Minister’s 
official website on 26 February 2012. 
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fear evidently came from not only the radar systems but also from the interceptor missiles 
being put in place to counter Iranian missiles.  
Vladimir Putin also explained the rationale of Russia’s professed fear of NATO 
missile defense in Europe and gave a warning to the United States regarding the EPAA’s 
implementation. On 26 February 2012, when he was serving as Prime Minister, he stated,  
U.S. plans to create a missile defence system in Europe give rise to 
legitimate fears in Russia. Why does that system worry us more than others? 
Because it affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only Russia 
possesses in that theatre, and upsets the military-political balance 
established over decades. . . I am loath to dismiss the possibility of reaching 
a compromise on missile defence. One would not like to see the deployment 
of the American system on a scale that would demand the implementation 
of our declared countermeasures.22 
Putin emphasized the threat not only to Russia but also to the military-political relationship 
between nations that had been established through the years. In 2012, General Nikolai 
Makarov articulated the “destabilization” argument as follows: “Taking into account a 
missile-defense system’s destabilizing nature, that is, the creation of an illusion that a 
disarming strike can be launched with impunity, a decision on pre-emptive use of the attack 
weapons available will be made when the situation worsens.”23 This declaration by 
General Makarov elaborated on the long-standing Russian argument that NATO missile 
defense could lead to a shift from a deterrent relationship to a pre-emptive situation due to 
the hypothetical ability of missile defense systems to intercept surviving missiles after a 
first strike.  
5. Secondary Sources 
Daniel Gouré’s paper has the merit of presenting a broad overview of available 
sources on the EPAA. He provides background not only on the programs of President 
George W. Bush’s administration but also gives a synopsis of what can be expected through 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Makes Threat on Missile-Defense Sites,” New York Times, 
May 4, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/world/europe/russian-general-threatens-pre-emptive-
attacks-on-missile-defense-sites.html. 
 11 
the implementation of the EPAA program, based on sources such as the BMDR.24 His 
paper examines the challenges that the program may face regarding technology and 
implementation, but devotes little attention to the potential effects on NATO. 
Roger Handberg also gives a broad overview and background about the origins of 
missile defense and the implementation of the EPAA. His paper differs from the works of 
most other authors in that he focuses on the budget limitations of the NATO Allies, 
including the United States.25 Handberg offers pertinent insights about the NATO-Russian 
interaction as a result of the EPAA.  
The study by Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni has the merit of clarifying the 
factors leading to the decision for missile defense in Europe as well as budget constraints, 
and also brings in the factors of burden sharing, public opinion, and technical challenges.26 
The wide variety of topics considered and the depth of knowledge provided make this paper 
among the most informative regarding challenges to the EPAA.  
Richard Weitz’s article provides background information, explores interactions 
involving Russia, NATO, and the United States, and addresses Moscow’s security 
concerns.27 Weitz offers broad insights into the various topics and offers suggestions as to 
where focus and attention need to be paid in the future. His paper offers suggestions to 
alleviate tensions between NATO and Russia by elaborating on a multinational system 
using assets from both sides. He asserts that NATO-Russian collaboration regarding BMD 
would not only help politically but also could reconcile past differences regarding missile 
defense and provide a strong deterrent message to Iran and other countries.  
The most informative sources on NATO-Russian interactions on missile defense 
include works by Mikhail Tsypkin and Roberto Zadra. Zadra’s article has the merit of 
                                                 
24 Daniel Gouré, “Phased-Adaptive Architecture: Technological, Operational and Political Issues,” 
Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 1, (2012): 17–35. DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2012.651376. 
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26 Steven J. Whitmore, and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive 
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27 Richard Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO, and Missile Defence,” 
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furnishing a comprehensive overview of the situation, and his article includes NATO-
Russia interactions in the period from NATO’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010 through 
NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012. His article considers not only the interactions 
involving Russia, NATO, and the United States at this time but also Russia’s major 
concerns regarding missile defense in Europe and America’s pursuit of global ambitions 
through the expansion of missile defenses in both Europe and Asia. His article also takes 
into account Russia’s proposals and the NATO responses with exceptional clarity. Overall, 
this article is one of the clearest and most authoritative works in providing evidence 
regarding NATO-Russia interactions.28 
Mikhail Tsypkin’s article also analyzes Russian reactions to NATO missile defense 
in Europe.29 His article gives valuable background regarding the mindset and fear 
regarding U.S. missile defense in Russia. Overall, this study provides a narrative clarifying 
Russian views regarding U.S. and NATO missile defense. By adding background 
concerning Russia’s past it throws light on Russian concerns and decisions regarding 
NATO missile defense. Tsypkin’s article focuses on decisions made by Vladimir Putin 
because he remains the most influential leader in Russia. This also makes Tsypkin’s article 
extremely relevant when analyzing interactions between the Obama Administration and 
Putin. 
Jaganath Sankaran’s book offers an overview of the system, including initial U.S. 
and Russian interactions in addition to the interactions between NATO and Russia. Like 
the studies by Roberto Zadra and Mikhail Tsypkin, Sankaran’s work is informative 
regarding the interactions and concerns on the part of the Russians. The overview of the 
program is followed by case studies regarding the probable effectiveness of the EPAA on 
missile threats originating both in Russia and Iran.30 The case studies provide quantitative 
analysis regarding the possibility of interception using different proposed sites within 
                                                 
28 Roberto Zadra, “NATO, Russia and Missile Defence,” Survival 56, no. 4 (August-September 2014). 
29 Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defence,” International 
Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009). 
30 Jaganath Sankaran, The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense 
System, (National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015). 
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Europe to counter threats to NATO Europe as well as the United States. Sankaran’s 
conclusions support the U.S. government’s view that the EPAA system does not threaten 
the credibility of Russia’s deterrent.  
Steven Hildreth’s work assesses Iran’s ballistic missile program.31 His paper 
differs completely from the other works considered in this literature review in that his paper 
does not examine missile defense in Europe at all. His work instead lays out facts, figures, 
and assessments of Iran’s missile programs in the past and today. His work gives 
supporting evidence to the rationale behind the four phases of the EPAA.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Hypothesis 1: Budget 
The first hypothesis concerns the budgets of the United States and the NATO 
Allies. The thesis investigates the hypothesis that budgetary constraints have had a major 
impact on U.S. and collective NATO decisions on missile defense. Steven Whitmore and 
John Deni suggest that the other NATO Alliance members are not doing enough to support 
the Alliance BMD mission. In their view, this makes it unclear to what extent this program 
will be successful in the future. Success is defined as the effective implementation of the 
U.S. and Allied contributions to the NATO missile defense architecture, providing the 
NATO Allies with sufficient missile defense capabilities. The answer will probably derive 
in part from the debate over the distribution of responsibilities for the overall protection of 
NATO Europe. To what extent have budget constraints hindered the implementation of the 
EPAA program as originally intended? With the cancellation of the fourth phase came the 
reprioritization of the budget towards spending more on the defense of U.S. territories 
rather than on the defense of NATO Europe.  
Another aspect of restructuring the budget came with the change in threat 
assessments concerning Iran. The September 2009 Fact Sheet on Missile Defense Policy 
states, “The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and 
                                                 
31 Stephen Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview, CRS Report No. RS22758. 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
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medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, 
while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities 
has been slower to develop than previously estimated.”32 This means that the United States 
could reallocate funds elsewhere because the threat from Iran’s development of 
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles was not maturing as quickly as originally expected. 
Reallocation of the budget due to changes in the threat level could mean that money could 
go to other areas of greater concern.  
2. Hypothesis 2: Technology  
The second hypothesis centers on whether the equipment procured for the EPAA 
will actually work as intended. Since the program is innovative, complex, and intricate, it 
can be expected that it will not perform as reliably as proven technologies. The interception 
of a ballistic missile is a complex operation with a condensed timeline to acquire and 
intercept the target. With current and emerging threats, there are questions as to what extent 
the remedies of the past will still work. To what extent will the Alliance be able to 
overcome technology shortcomings as they are identified?  
3. Hypothesis 3: Russia’s Response 
The third hypothesis explores whether and to what extent the EPAA’s implemented 
policy fell short of the original intent due to interactions between the Obama 
Administration and Russia. This section will analyze whether policy changes, notably the 
cancellation of the fourth phase of the EPAA, were influenced in part by a U.S. attempt to 
mollify the Russians and forge stronger ties with Moscow.  
4. Hypothesis 4: Interactions with NATO Allies 
The fourth hypothesis considers the interactions between the Obama 
Administration and the other NATO Allies. It will examine to what extent interactions 
                                                 
32 “U.S. Missile Defense Policy A Phased, Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe,” Office 
of the Press Secretary, 17 September 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/fact-
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between the United States and its NATO Allies definitively caused the original objectives 
of the EPAA to be modified.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research assesses the original objectives of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) and modifications from 2009 to 2017. This thesis investigates multiple 
aspects of the topic, including the relations involving the United States, Russia, and the 
NATO Allies, to analyze the extent that interactions influenced the EPAA program’s 
implementation.  
These various aspects are chosen for multiple reasons. First, the thesis undertakes 
a review of the interactions among the United States, Russia, and the NATO Allies 
concerning missile defense and the EPAA in particular. Official documents and published 
analyses provide grounds for the hypotheses to be evaluated. Examining specifically the 
United States and its NATO Allies allows for conclusions regarding modifications 
involving budgets on their part. Assessing these aspects also allows for an examination of 
technology factors, including to what extent shortfalls, delays, and other challenges helped 
to cause modifications to the original objectives of the EPAA.  
As noted in the literature review, this thesis relies on United States Government, 
NATO, and Russian official documents and sources, including statements by national 
leaders. Secondary sources are used to complement the evidence found in the primary 
sources. An analysis of the primary and secondary sources supports conclusions regarding 
the hypothesis that the original objectives of the EPAA were modified in the course of U.S. 
interactions with Russia and the NATO Allies.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. This first chapter serves as the 
introduction. The second chapter examines the origins and objectives of missile defense in 
NATO. It furnishes background regarding what preceded and led to the EPAA. It also 
provides a description of the EPAA, and examines the Obama Administration’s original 
plans and the actual implementation of the project. The third chapter explores NATO’s 
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reactions and contributions to the Alliance missile defense architecture, including the 
EPAA. The fourth chapter analyzes Russia’s reactions to the EPAA. The fifth and 
concluding chapter summarizes the decisive factors that affected the implementation of the 





II. HISTORY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
This chapter explores the history of ballistic missile defense and reviews the 
programs, documents, and treaties that led to the development of NATO’s missile defense 
posture. More specifically, how did these programs contribute to and shape the current 
Alliance missile defense posture and later lead to the original objectives of the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)? 
A. SZILARD LETTER (1939) AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MANHATTAN PROJECT (1941) 
In 1939, Leo Szilard wrote a letter, signed by Albert Einstein, to President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, warning him of coming advances in weaponry:  
In the course of the last four months, it has been made probable—through 
the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America—that 
it may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of 
uranium by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new 
radium-like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain 
that this could be achieved in the immediate future.33  
This letter was significant because it started not only the development of nuclear weapons 
but also the pursuit of defenses against nuclear-armed missiles.  
The Szilard letter led to the founding of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. effort to 
develop the atomic bomb. Donald L. Hafner observes, “In 1941, two years after crucial 
scientific work by Szilard and Fermi suggested an atomic bomb might be feasible, the 
Manhattan Project began its task with promise from the project advocates that a workable 
nuclear system could be ready within two years. It took four.”34 At the same time that the 
United States took the lead in the development of nuclear weapons, Germany’s 
development, production, and employment of the V-2 rocket created the necessity for a 
                                                 
33 Albert Einstein, “Einstein-Szilard Letter,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, accessed February 15, 
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34 Donald L. Hafner, “Assessing the President’s Vision: the Fletcher, Miller, and Hoffman Panels,” in 
Weapons in Space, ed. Franklin A. Long, Donald Hafner, and Jeffrey Boutwell (New York: W.W. Norton 
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capability to counter it. The necessity to counter missile threats led to research and systems 
for this purpose. 
B. BACKGROUND ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (1940s–1960s) 
1. V-2 Rocket, Project Wizard, and Project Thumper 
Ballistic missile defense started near the end of World War II, and it was developed 
to counter the German V-2 rocket. The V-1 flying bomb preceded the V-2 rocket and was 
only somewhat unreliable but was able to save on both fuel and air crews.35 According to 
Lawrence Freedman,  
It has been estimated that the campaign cost the British four times as much 
to deal with it as it cost the Germans to wage. The V-2 rocket however, 
though a greater technical achievement, was inefficient. For improvements 
in performance (greater speed and reliability in penetrating air defences) 
and an added sense of spectacle, it cost one hundred times as much as the 
V-1.36  
This is significant because, although the British people were able to continue fighting 
despite the German missile attacks, the V-2 rocket presented a greater challenge than the 
V-1.  
In November 1944, the General Electric Company was contracted through the U.S. 
Army for Project Thumper, whose goal was to investigate a way to protect Americans and 
allies from the V-2 rocket.37 The V-2 rocket, originally used against London in 1944, could 
only be stopped by attacking missiles on the launch pad or in production. The V-2 was 
impossible to intercept once launched.38 The V-2s were inaccurate because there was no 
way to aim them towards their targets with precision.   
                                                 
35 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 12. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Alexander Moens, NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to 
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in an Imperfect World,” 45.  
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In March 1946, the United States Army Air Force commenced two study programs 
to design an antiballistic missile: Project Wizard (MX-794) and Project Thumper (MX-
795).39 These projects were the first to try to develop technology that could counter the 
German V-2 missile. The plans later expanded to include all supersonic threats above 
60,000 feet, but both programs were ultimately combined into Project Wizard in 1949.40 
Project Wizard continued until 1959, when it was terminated due to its comparative lack 
of cost effectiveness.41  
2. NATO Strategic Concept (1949) 
The NATO Allies laid out their Strategic Concept in 1949. It was centered on 
nuclear deterrence and called for the Allies  
to coordinate, in time of peace, our military and economic strength with a 
view to creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations 
threatening the peace, independence and stability of the North Atlantic 
family of nations. . . [and to] Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing 
promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without 
exception.42  
This is significant because the document set out the groundwork for the mutual 
commitment to the protection of the allied nations. It also aimed to counter all threats aimed 
against the Allies. The next sentence of the 1949 Strategic Concept is extremely relevant 
even today: “This is primarily a U.S. responsibility assisted as practicable by other 
nations.”43 This statement is significant because this idea remains the same and relevant 
today. Later chapters of this thesis further explore the U.S. role in European missile defense 
during the Obama administration. However, this statement reflects the idea that the United 
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States is fulfilling its proper role, and this counters some later criticism regarding burden 
sharing. 
3. Project Plato and PATRIOT 
After the 1940s, missile defense programs expanded quickly. In the 1950s, ballistic 
missiles replaced bombers for various reasons, including the bomber’s difficulty in 
penetrating defenses and reaching the target.44 The first project to commence in the 1950s 
was Project Plato, designed to meet the Army’s requirement for a theatre ABM in 1949. 
Project Plato led to a succession of systems, which ultimately developed SAM-D, which 
today is known as Phased Array Tracking Radar Intercept on Target (PATRIOT).45 The 
more advanced versions of PATRIOT are still in use today, notably in the U.S. Army as an 
integral part of theatre level ballistic missile defense. Raytheon has sold the PATRIOT 
system to the following European countries: Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, 
and Spain. This has promoted cooperation in the implementation of the system.  
4. Nike Zeus, Project Defender, and Nike-X ABM 
In 1955, the United States received intelligence reports regarding the looming 
Soviet ICBM threat, and this caused the Department of Defense to launch a development 
program that was intended to counter this Soviet threat.46 The development led to Nike-
Zeus and Project Defender, which were later abandoned in favor of the Nike-X ABM 
system. The Nike-Zeus system, started in early 1957, was composed of radars and 
interceptor missiles that could be used to intercept high-altitude targets.47 In December 
1962, the Nike-Zeus system was able to successfully intercept an Atlas D Missile.48 This 
was significant because it proved that the United States could develop a system that would 
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be able to counter the Soviet threat, at least in some circumstances. The Nike-X ABM 
system would later also have the ability to intercept low-altitude targets and upgraded 
radars.49  
In the mid-1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his defense secretary, Robert 
S. McNamara, did not agree with the Joints Chief of Staff that deploying the Nike-X ABM 
system would be the correct move in regard to the Soviets. Instead, Johnson and McNamara 
believed that the proper counter to the Soviet ICBM threat would be either concluding an 
arms control agreement limiting Soviet SLBMs and ICBMs or overcoming the Soviet 
threat with offensive capabilities.50 The debate was settled after a failure to conclude an 
arms control agreement with the Soviets in 1967 when Secretary McNamara announced 
the deployment of Sentinel, which was based on the Nike-X ABM system and that would 
be used to counter the new Chinese threat.51 The reorientation of the project led to 
controversy, which President Richard Nixon attempted to put to rest during his presidency. 
5. Reorientation of Missile Defense: Sentinel 
In 1969, President Nixon reoriented U.S. policy on missile defense. He changed the 
focus by shifting the Sentinel system from urban area defense to protecting Minuteman 
ICBMs.52 President Nixon also renamed the program from Sentinel to Safeguard. He also 
modified the deployment numbers and the locations of the missiles as well as the radar 
components.53 The Safeguard program became a major bargaining point during the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, which was signed in May 1972 and ratified later that year.54  
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C. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT) AND ANTI-
BALLISTIC (ABM) TREATY 
In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement in the SALT 
negotiations, which consisted of both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an 
interim agreement relating to strategic offensive arms.55 The purpose of the ABM Treaty 
was to limit U.S. and Soviet ABM systems, including the number of fixed missile defense 
sites.56 These sites were further restricted by the 1974 amendment to the ABM Treaty. 
According to David Yost, “The ABM Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 protocol were welcomed 
in Western Europe for all of the reasons why BMD was recently opposed. The main benefit 
was seen as stabilization of the arms race and East-West relations generally, with a firm 
foundation for continuing détente.”57 Yost quoted Ian Smart, who provided three more 
reasons why the Western Europeans endorsed it: “1) the continued credibility of the British 
and French deterrents was enhanced. 2) The United States insisted that Article IX of the 
ABM Treaty (which prohibits the transfer of ABM technology to third countries) would 
not prevent the transfer of offensive weapons technology. 3) The United States did not 
make itself less vulnerable to ballistic missile attack than its Allies.”58 All three of these 
reasons offer strong evidence regarding why the ABM Treaty was supported in Western 
Europe. Alexander Flax wrote that 
The signing of the ABM treaty in 1972, however, radically changed 
Safeguard deployment plans. The treaty, together with a subsequent 
protocol, permitted a total of only one hundred interceptors in only one of 
two types of deployment, for defense of a strategic missile site or for 
defense of the national capital.59  
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The ABM treaty was successful in reducing the total number of interceptors and 
was maintained for approximately 30 years. President George W. Bush announced in 
December 2001 that the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty would take 
effect in June 2002. Russia and the United States nonetheless agreed to further nuclear 
weapons reductions in the May 2002 Moscow Treaty.  
D. PRIORITY SHIFT OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY 
1. Strategic Defense Initiative  
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan instituted the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
to shift U.S. security policy away from nuclear deterrence and nuclear “assured 
destruction” to an increased emphasis on strategic defenses. President Reagan in National 
Security Decision Directive Number 119 stated that, “given the uncertain long-term future 
of offensive deterrence, I believe that an effort must also be made to identify alternative 
means of deterring nuclear war and protecting our national security interests.”60 In another 
directive, he called for “effective programs [providing] continuity of government, strategic 
connectivity, and civil defense.”61 Reagan’s judgments became the backbone of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, which he launched on 23 March 1983. Steven Hadley argues 
that, “Diplomatically, SDI was a major factor in the Soviet decision in January 1985 to 
return to the negotiating table after having walked out of the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START) late in 1983.”62 In other words, the United States was able to use 
technological advances to encourage Moscow to come to the table to talk.  
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2. GPALS, PAC-3, and THAAD 
The end of the Cold War also led to a change in the BMD policies of the United 
States. President George H.W. Bush called for a review of the SDI program, and this 
resulted in a shift from SDI to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in 
1991.63 The aim of the new system was to establish an integrated architecture, which would 
protect Americans at home as well as U.S. allies and deployed forces overseas from small, 
accidental, or unauthorized missile attacks.64  
The new system’s focus on protection against limited ICBM attacks opened the 
way to a greater concentration on Theatre Missile Defense during the Clinton 
administration. Under President Bill Clinton, the Department of Defense broke up the 
programs into separate components such as PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) 
and Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).65 Both of these systems are still in use 
today for theatre level defense. Clinton also signed the National Missile Defense Act of 
1999, which started the development of a new National Missile Defense system.66 While 
Clinton’s actions helped to set the future of missile defense in motion, missile defense 
received a new impetus as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 
(9/11). 
3. U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and GMD Interceptors 
U.S. missile defense changed drastically after the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
President George W. Bush immediately took a strong stance and called for taking the 
shortest time possible to deploy missile defenses and told Russia of the U.S. intention to 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty.67 President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, and the BMDO Director, Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, reoriented the 
program towards an integrated, layered defense system capable of defeating missiles in all 
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phases of flight.68 The layered defense was achieved by combining the PAC-3 and AEGIS 
with Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors. The combination of these 
three systems allowed for the interception of all ranges of ballistic missiles, including 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the end, the Barack Obama administration built on the 
previous systems to pursue the European Phased Adaptive Approach.  
E. BMDR REVIEW OF 2010 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) started in 2009, and it was 
conducted concurrently with the Nuclear Posture Review. The first report was completed 
and the findings were released in 2010. The Department of Defense defined the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review as “a review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President 
and the Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the legislative requirement to assess 
U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. The BMDR will evaluate the threats 
posed by ballistic missiles and develop a missile defense posture to address current and 
future challenges.”69 This focus gives the United States a tool not only to assess its own 
defenses but also to evaluate threats and how quickly technology is advancing. By 
completing this review, U.S. policy-makers and experts were assisting in keeping the 
United States safe. According to the final report released in 2010,  
Deterrence is a powerful tool, and the United States is seeking to strengthen 
deterrence against these new challenges. But deterrence by threat of a strong 
offensive response may not be effective against these states in a time of 
political-military crisis. Risk-taking leaders may conclude that they can 
engage the United States in a confrontation if they can raise the stakes high 
enough by demonstrating the potential to do further harm with their 
missiles. Thus U.S. missile defenses are critical to strengthening regional 
deterrence.70 
This explanation clarifies the significance of deterrence and why the Obama administration 
chose in some cases to deviate from the original objectives that were set forth in the 
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European Phased Adaptive Approach architecture for the defense of Europe and the United 
States.  
F. LISBON (2010) AND CHICAGO (2012) SUMMIT 
The Lisbon Summit took place in November 2010 and the Chicago Summit took 
place in May 2012. At the Lisbon Summit the Alliance and Russia agreed to “resume 
theatre missile defence cooperation and to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the 
future framework for missile defense cooperation.”71 This included a joint exercise, which 
was held in Germany in March 2012. Russia suggested on the basis of this exercise that 
the lessons learned report leaned to evidence supporting a joint solution.72  
At the Chicago Summit the Allies put forth two proposals for missile defense 
cooperation for Russia to consider. First, the Alliance suggested that they work together to 
create two joint NATO-Russia Command and Control Centers.73 This option would have 
allowed both sides to work together to share intelligence as well as to plan and then 
coordinate on missile defense options.74 This option proposed by NATO did not happen 
because “Moscow was not ready to consider its proposal.”75 This option would have been 
the most advantageous to both sides and could have eliminated some of the issues between 
both sides on the European system that are discussed in greater depth in chapter III and 
chapter IV. The second proposal that was brought up at the Chicago Summit was “to 
develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the 
current respective missile defense capabilities of NATO and Russia.”76 This proposal was 
not pursued due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of Washington and Moscow.77 This, like 
the former option, could have opened up dialogue between both sides and could have 
                                                 








eliminated some of the concerns on either side. As with the former option, though, this was 
not to be the case.  
G. ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH 
On September 17, 2009, President Obama announced the implementation of a new 
U.S. missile defense system in Europe. President Obama stated,  
To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will 
provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and 
America’s Allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program; it 
deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and 
builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. homeland against long-
range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of 
all our NATO Allies.78 
The Barack Obama administration instituted the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA) system to defend Europe against current and future threats from Iran. The EPAA 
missile defense system was to consist of four phases that would begin implementation in 
2011 and continue through 2022. 
1. EPAA Phase 1  
Phase 1 of the system commenced in March 2011 and consisted of outfitting SM3-
1A and SM3-1B interceptors on Aegis ships, such as the USS MONTEREY, which would 
deploy to the Mediterranean Sea. On March 7, 2011, ships from the United States forward 
deployed to Rota, Spain; and the Ramstein, Germany, Command Center became 
operational.79 The second part of Phase 1 included placing a land-based radar in Turkey.80 
This land based radar is known as the Forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar 
Surveillance System (AN/TPY-2), and it is fully operational.81 The missiles that were to 
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be deployed during this phase were designed to defend against short and medium range 
missiles launched from Iran. Short-range missiles have ranges less than 1,000 kilometers 
while medium range ballistic missiles have a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers.82 There 
is speculation that Iran is developing an extended medium range ballistic missile (also 
known as an intermediate range ballistic missile) capable of traveling between 4,000 and 
5,000 kilometers.83 
2. EPAA Phase 2 
 Phase 2 was scheduled to begin in 2015 and involved installing a land based 
AEGIS SPY-1 radar known as AEGIS Ashore in Deveselu, Romania.84 Phase 2 also 
involved deploying SM3-IB missiles on AEGIS ships and at sites ashore.85 This was an 
important upgrade because the SM3-IB is more capable and has a faster burnout velocity 
than its predecessor.  
3. EPAA Phase 3 
The first two phases of the EPAA have been implemented and the next phase is set 
to begin implementation in the near future. Phase 3 of the EPAA system is scheduled to 
begin in 2018, and it will provide for a second AEGIS Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, 
as well as SM3-IIA interceptors.86 The SM3-IIA interceptors in this phase have a quicker 
burnout velocity than the SM3-IB and are designed to defend against medium and 
intermediate range missiles.87 This is different from the SM3-IA, which could only defend 
against medium range missiles. This gives the United States and its NATO allies greater 
defense capability and more flexibility.  
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4. EPAA Phase 4 
Phase IV was planned to be completed in 2022, and it would have placed SM3-IIBs 
in Poland. It was also planned to deploy the SM3-IIB missiles with the capability to defend 
against intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles.88 An intercontinental 
range ballistic missile is capable of traveling more than 5,500 kilometers.89 Phase IV of 
the EPAA system was, however, canceled in March 2013.90  
H. CONCLUSION 
Missile defense has long been an important feature of policy for the United States 
and NATO, especially since the 1960s. The priority to keep the territories and the 
populations of the United States and the Alliance as a whole safe has been and will continue 
to be important as threats evolve and change over time. The EPAA system is an adaptable 
architecture for the protection of the United States and Europe, and it is capable of being 
modified as requirements change.  
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III. NATO RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE 
APPROACH 
This paper will explore the relationship between the United States and the other 
NATO Allies in regard to the Alliance missile defense posture. More specifically, how did 
the responses of the NATO Allies to growing missile threats shape their national and 
collective contributions to the Alliance missile defense posture and eventually affect the 
original objectives of the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), America’s 
contribution to NATO’s missile defense posture? 
A. BUDGET CRITIQUE OF THE EPAA 
The European Phased Adaptive Approach was generally accepted by the other 
Allies as a valuable contribution to the collective defense of Europe. However, budget 
constraints have affected not only the United States but also its Canadian and European 
Allies as well. NATO officials argue that the collective defense capability (territorial 
missile defense) will cost the member states approximately 200 million euros (that is 
approximately 260 million U.S. dollars) over a ten-year period from 2010 to 2020.91  
According to Steven Hildreth and Carl Ek, “This amount was characterized as an 
additional expenditure for upgrading the alliance’s existing ALTBMD program, which is 
expected to cost approximately 800 million euros (approximately $1 billion) over 14 
years.”92 This is a significant amount of money in view of budget constraints on the part 
of NATO allies. Steven Whitmore and John Deni argue that the European alliance 
members were more cash strapped than the United States in 2009 and therefore were eager 
to take part in the program; but they did not possess the funds to contribute on the level of 
the Americans.93 The compromise came with the Allies offering to contribute to Alliance 
missile defense with land or facilities. This shifted the mindset towards a layered defense 
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system with the intent to integrate national assets towards a collective command and 
control system.94  
The donation of national assets was an attempt to please the Americans and to show 
their willingness to participate in the collective defense of Europe with what they could 
provide. Whitmore and Deni argue that while these offers satisfied Washington, few Allies 
have actually followed through with their pledges.95 The lack of follow through has had a 
profound impact on the project and on public opinion today on this issue and other issues 
within NATO.  
One major result of the lack of follow through and budget constraints on the part of 
the United States is the cancellation of phase four of the EPAA. Whitmore and Deni argue 
that the fourth phase was canceled in March 2013 due to a reprioritization of the budget 
that shifted resources from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.96 While this reprioritization 
may have had some effect on the cancellation of the EPAA’s fourth phase, the major factor 
still seems to have been the lack of balanced burden sharing between the United States and 
its NATO allies. The unsatisfactory burden sharing has caused the program to fall short of 
its original plans. 
Likewise, the other side of the argument concerns the cost effective nature of an 
early intercept (EI) system. The Defense Science Board study in September 2011 revealed 
that there is “potential for EI to provide most cost effective BMD insofar as it can contribute 
to reducing the number of interceptors needed/expended in both regional and homeland 
defense scenarios.”97 This is significant because cost effectiveness offers a solution to 
budget constraints on the side of both the European Allies and the United States. It provides 
a positive situation because both defense and deterrence are maintained at an acceptable 
cost to the contributors. Greater cost effectiveness can be achieved through a combination 
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of policy changes, which allow for the smallest number of interceptors needed for the 
mission.98 The reduction in the number of interceptors can be achieved by implementing 
a policy of Shoot-Assess-Shoot (S-A-S).99 While there are technical challenges with this 
policy, which will be discussed in depth later, the potential for reductions in the number of 
required interceptors for each enemy ballistic missile offers the possibility of cost 
reduction. It could also aid the United States in homeland defense by eliminating the 
regional threat so that valuable and expensive homeland defense assets (such as ground-
based interceptors, or GBIs) would not have to be used.100 This could provide a huge 
benefit to the United States and its NATO Allies and strengthen deterrence by having a 
collective defense which challenges adversaries.  
President Obama also saw the cost benefits in the system. On September 17, 2009, 
he stated, “Out new approach will therefore deploy technologies that are proven and cost 
effective and that counter the current threat, and do so sooner than the previous program. 
Because our approach will be phased and adaptive, we will retain the flexibility to adjust 
and enhance our defenses as the threat and technology continue to evolve.” This statement 
is significant because it touches on the idea of budget and cost effectiveness in 
procurement, and it shows an openness to changes in the program, which led to the program 
not meeting its original objectives.  
Furthermore, one can see the understanding of cost from the American perspective 
because it is included in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The BMDR 
report states, “The Administration recognizes that allies do not view the specifics of the 
missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, 
but there is general recognition of a growing threat and the need to take steps now to 
address both existing threats and emerging ones.”101 This statement explains the view of 
the Obama Administration, which was that NATO member states only need to contribute 
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what they can feasibly provide. It also places the emphasis on preparation not just for 
current threats but also for those that may develop in the future.  
B. TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES 
While on paper the EPAA plan looks solid and feasible, it has fallen short of its 
original goals due to technical challenges such as target acquisition, discrimination, 
interception, and data networking.102 Whitmore and Deni argue that the technical 
challenges have been among the core European objections regarding BMD for decades.103 
This implies that Whitmore and Deni believe that the Alliance missile defense effort was 
doomed to fail because the allies do not believe that the technical challenges can be 
overcome at an affordable cost. This implies in turn that the allies will invest fewer 
resources than the United States to overcome these challenges. The EPAA is the U.S. 
contribution to the NATO missile defense architecture, and it is by far the largest national 
contribution.  
The first major technical issue with the EPAA system is target acquisition. The 
DOD Defense Science Board (DSB) concluded in 2011 that the x-band radar system, which 
will be used in the EPAA architecture, is “not adequate for a robust defense of Alliance 
territory.”104 This is important to understand because once again it shows that the United 
States has not yet been able to develop and deploy an effective defense against ballistic 
missiles in Europe. The EPAA plan that was presented by President Obama to the United 
States and its Allies in September 2009 has fallen short of its original desired goals.  
The second and third technical issues with the system are target discrimination and 
data networking. Target discrimination is the ability to discern whether the objects detected 
are threats, missile junk, or decoys. The shortage of time available for target discrimination 
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is the greatest challenge that a missile defense system faces. The necessity to discriminate 
the correct target while in the mid-course phase of flight and the necessity of fusing 
computational data allow little room for error on the part of the operator when assessing a 
data set.105 The first aspect of this is straightforward. Interceptor missiles are expensive 
and should not be wasted by hitting shrapnel or decoys instead of the desired target. The 
necessity to discriminate the correct target while in the mid-course of flight is important to 
obtain the greatest chances of success with the interceptor. The technical issue surrounding 
the efficient and effective fusing of data is the largest and perhaps most demanding of these 
issues. In order for the EPAA system to work properly it employs sensors at sea, on land, 
and in space. These sensors must all work together to create a complete and accurate picture 
in as little time as possible. This is the ideal, but it is not always reality when trying to 
identify a target that is traveling at high speed and releasing penetration aids. This issue 
may be less of a hindrance as the system and technology continue to improve, despite the 
continuing capability enhancements on the part of the enemy. 
The fourth technical issue with the EPAA deals with the interception of the target. 
Whitmore and Deni describe the current firing policy as shoot-assess-shoot, the policy 
recommended by the DSB in 2011.106 This means that one has to have a fast enough 
interceptor and enough time to execute the entire timeline. As noted previously, the shoot-
assess-shoot protocol is also the most cost efficient way of conducting BMD, because it 
provides (at least in favorable circumstances) time for the operator to assess the situation 
after shooting before firing again and thus saving vital resources. The current EPAA plan 
falls short of meeting these expectations because current missiles do not have a burnout 
velocity fast enough to meet the shoot-assess-shoot firing policy. Phase 1 and Phase 2 of 
the EPAA utilize the SM3-IA and SM3-IB, which have a burnout velocity of 3 km/sec and 
3.5 km/sec respectively.107 Currently Phase 3 of the EPAA intends to introduce the SM3-
IIA missile, which will have a burnout velocity of 4.5 km/sec.108 This new missile will 
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allow for the new shoot-assess-shoot firing policy to theoretically be achieved. Whitmore 
and Deni state that this missile will achieve the firing policy if the test and evaluation 
phases of the SM-3 IIA are able to overcome the technical challenges that are uncovered 
through the testing.109 Ultimately, the final outcome will depend on whether the plan 
comes to fruition as originally envisioned.  
C. ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO EPAA 
The EPAA was generally accepted by the allies, but they failed to follow through 
with the commitments they made to the United States regarding the Alliance’s missile 
defense posture. The biggest obstacle to alliance missile remains with allied budgets. Roger 
Handberg argues that budget limits pose a challenge to BMD in Europe.110 He holds that 
if the USA was not involved in the European BMD efforts the European Allies would not 
be pursuing missile defense. This is significant because, if the Europeans view BMD as 
lacking importance, there is no reason why they would feel inclined to assist the United 
States in building a complete and functional Alliance missile defense posture. They will 
instead contribute to missile defense in the areas they do find important or that best suit 
them. Handberg also argues that if the EPAA system proves effective it will cause the 
United States to hide behind its BMD wall, which will ultimately cause the United States 
to be disengaged from other important world issues.111 This argument does not have any 
merit. An Alliance BMD posture would not only protect the European Allies but would 
also protect the American troops in Europe. It would protect not only the military but the 
civilians as well. 
Furthermore, the Alliance remained concern over the United States’ decision to 
cancel Phase 4 of the EPAA. David S. Yost elaborates on this argument by explaining,  
Some European experts and officials have argued that the cancellation of 
phase 4 has made phase 3 more vulnerable in U.S. budget planning and 
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politics, because phase 3 is configured essentially for the defense of Europe. 
In their view, the abandonment of the fourth phase has raised uncertainty 
about future U.S. missile defense investments, since this phase was the part 
of the EPAA most pertinent to U.S. national defense.112 
This argument refers back to budget concerns earlier in the chapter. Not only does it 
question the U.S. commitment to the collective missile defense, but it also makes it much 
more likely that the U.S. would be willing to cut more of the budget that had been allocated 
to the other phases due to their purpose being defense of Europe and not defense of the 
U.S. homeland.  
1. Opinion Surveys in Poland and Czech Republic 
Furthermore, public opinion surveys in Poland and the Czech Republic revealed 
opposition to U.S. missile defense systems in Europe.113 These surveys were conducted 
and published in December 2008, before President Obama’s September 2009 
announcement of the EPAA system. However, the surveys show a baseline of hesitation 
and opposition that existed in Europe even prior to the EPAA announcement. Their 
opposition was due to concerns surrounding sovereignty as well as the possibility of 
antagonizing Russia.114 The concerns that surfaced from the surveys represent reasonable 
interests for both of these countries due to their historical relations with Russia. These 
relations influence their interest in maintaining the sovereignty of their country. Fear of 
antagonizing Russia is reasonable in light of their historical relations with Moscow. Critics 
argue that missile defense puts Poland and the Czech Republic in a predicament because it 
places them in the center of the tension between the United States and Russia. There is 
further division among opinions in Europe over which ballistic missile threat is the most 
likely and relevant for Europe. This is a significant topic because individual NATO 
members disagree based on the threat to each individual country. For example, member 
states tend to disagree with Americans on the magnitude of Iran’s ballistic missile 
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threat.115 The 2007 Transatlantic Trends Survey found that 68 percent of Americans, and 
only 54 percent of Europeans were concerned with Iran’s nuclear threat in Europe.116 This 
is significant because the disparity influences how European countries choose to spend 
their budgetary resources for the common defense. It is also the reason why the United 
States believes this is such a significant topic.  
2. Polish View on Missile Defense 
The interest in an ABM system as well as ground-based interceptors provided by 
the United States has been expressed by the Polish government since 2004.117 One major 
reason for Warsaw’s close ties to NATO is concern over Russia.118 This is important 
because of Poland’s history of relations with Russia and Belarus (a close ally of Russia).119 
Second, Poland’s relationship with Russia deteriorated quickly when Warsaw agreed to 
allow the United States to place ten Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) on Polish soil.120 
Russia quickly responded by deploying Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad Oblast.121 
This was significant because it showed Poland’s concerns with Russia and vice versa. It 
was also one of the first examples of deterioration in the NATO-Russia relationship prior 
to 2014. This is further supported by a speech by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s President 
from 2008 to 2012. On November 23, 2011, Medvedev stated: “[If] the above measures 
prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems 
in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the U.S. 
missile defence system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander 
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missiles in Kaliningrad Region.”122 This quotation is significant because publically NATO 
and Russia still had an open dialogue regarding a joint missile defence system. It is, 
however, clear that this relationship was already fractured beyond near-term repair. 
Poland’s concerns about Russia are understandable, given Russian threats to destroy 
European-based U.S. missile defenses.  
Poland supported a missile defense system being installed on its territory because 
it offered some reassurance from NATO allies. Andrew Somerville, Ian Kearns, and 
Malcolm Chalmers elaborate on this as follows:  
Whereas Poland perceives the presence of any US/NATO military 
infrastructure on its territory as a desirable form of strategic reassurance, 
Russia opposes any such deployment and argues that it goes against the 
commitment not to deploy further NATO forces in Central and Eastern 
Europe made in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.123 
This clarifies the tension between Russia and NATO as well as Poland’s concerns 
regarding Russia. Strategic reassurance is important not only for the government in Poland 
but also for the Polish people.  
3. Canadian View on Missile Defense 
Canada’s opinion on missile defense differs greatly from the views of both the 
European Allies and the United States. Despite agreeing to participate in collective defense, 
the Canadian government has done little to actually provide for the missile defense system. 
One explanation for Canada’s restraint has been suggested by Frank Harvey, Colin 
Robertson, and James Fergusson: “Perhaps Canadian officials are perfectly secure in the 
belief (hope) that U.S. officials will fulfill their obligation to protect their closest NATO 
ally from any and all incoming missiles. So why rock the boat- we’re quietly participating 
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in BMD without having to engage in another public debate on the subject.”124 This seems 
to be a sub-optimal decision as silently participating without outright guarantees from the 
United States that Washington will indeed protect Canada means that by remaining quiet 
Canadian officials may actually be putting their people in danger. Harvey, Robertson, and 
Fergusson argue, “Ottawa should engage in high-level consultations with Washington on 
BMD architecture, precisely because the government has already embraced the strategic 
imperatives tied to BMD. Drawing imaginary distinctions between American, European 
and Asia security on the one hand, and Canadian security on the other, makes no sense.”125 
In other words, trying to separate Canadian security from the security of Canada’s allies is 
not the correct answer when it comes to deterrence and protection.  
Canada has been a constant quiet partner in BMD. The Senate Testimony of Colin 
Robertson explains the main criticisms advanced by Canadians concerning missile defense 
despite Canada’s central role in NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command. According to Robertson, “Criticism of BMD boils down to the following: First, 
according to critics, it doesn’t work and it weaponizes space. It’s a latter-day Maginot Line 
costly, unreliable, and provocative. NORAD, they argue, provides sufficient defence but 
they forget that, at the critical moment, we must leave the room.”126  
This criticism revolves around the idea that the programs are expensive and that 
BMD weaponizes space. This criticism leaves out the fact that Canada agreed in 2010 with 
its NATO Allies to build a BMD system. The development of the BMD system in Europe 
will continue regardless of Canadian participation.  
Robertson adds, “The second criticism of BMD is that it makes us too reliant on 
the USA.”127 This opinion again is a common thread between Canada and its European 
NATO Allies. This argument does not hold up because the program is “collective defense.” 
This means that the BMD posture is not just other countries relying on the United States 
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but rather Alliance member countries contributing towards a program that provides 
protection and security for all the Allies.  
Robertson’s third and final argument is that Canada may continue to not participate 
in BMD because some Canadians think that BMD it is “morally wrong.”128 He does not 
elaborate on this critique further but only supplements it by saying “But we live in the real 
world, not Elysium.”129 This response supports the idea that the NATO Allies live in a 
world where security is threatened. Canada has no more control over whether a missile is 
fired at its territory than anyone else does. By participating Canada may help to save many 
Canadian lives in the event of a missile attack.  
4. Turkish View on Missile Defense 
Despite the fact that equipment for the EPAA system is based in Turkey, Ankara 
has had some reservations regarding what is guaranteed to Turkey through NATO. 
According to Nilsu Gören, “Turkey has political and technical concerns about NATO 
guarantees under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), leading to the 
proposition that Turkey needs to develop indigenous air and missile defense capabilities to 
reduce vulnerability.”130 Turkey is concerned about being vulnerable despite hosting a 
NATO missile defense component. While Poland was reassured by the EPAA system, 
Turkey evidently regards it as insufficient.  
Gören has described Turkey’s other concerns as follows: “The main concerns that 
Turkey initially had with hosting the radar were naming Iran as a threat, the U.S. command 
and control not allowing any Turkish influence, whether the missile shield would cover all 
of Turkey, and data sharing with non-NATO countries, Israel in particular.”131 All of the 
concerns raised by Turkey were understandable. Other Allies have also voiced concerns 
regarding their inputs into the U.S. command and control system.  
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Turkey’s interest in acquiring its own BMD system has caused concern especially 
among its NATO Allies. Turkey has sought help with developing or purchasing an air of 
missile defense system from countries such as China and Russia.132 This has raised anxiety 
because it implies Turkey’s possible shift from cooperation with its NATO Allies towards 
working with non-NATO countries. With U.S. equipment already hosted on Turkish 
territory, Ankara’s NATO Allies are concerned about what might happen if NATO cannot 
reassure Turkey and it continues to shift away from NATO. 
5. NATO Allies Collective View 
Ultimately, the decisive opinion in Europe from the Allies is centered around the 
idea that even a limited BMD coverage is more advantageous than no coverage at all in the 
region.133 This means that even a partially working system provides the Allies with the 
benefit of some deterrence against their adversaries and a defense option in the event of 
deterrence failure. This goes back to the idea that a BMD system in Europe is not designed 
solely for the protection of the United States but rather is intended to protect all of NATO 
Europe, including American allies, troops, capabilities, and interests in Europe. While 
opinions in Europe have historically swayed between approval and disapproval for 
Alliance BMD, the Russians have completely opposed there being a BMD system in 
NATO Europe.  
In March 2010, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then the Alliance Secretary General, said, 
“We need a decision by NATO’s next summit in November that missile defense for our 
populations and territories is an alliance mission. And that we will explore every 
opportunity to cooperate with Russia.”134 He was referring to a decision that needed to be 
made prior to the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. His statement was important because 
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it showed that he not only supported an Alliance missile defense but also that he could 
foresee possible cooperation with non-NATO members like Russia. At the November 2010 
Summit the NATO Allies agreed as follows: 
In light of common security interests, we are determined to build a lasting 
and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the Euro-Atlantic Area. We 
need to share responsibility in facing up to common challenges, jointly 
identified. We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and 
Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from 
Russia. We recommit ourselves to the goals, principles and commitments 
which underpin the NRC.135 
In 2012, Alexander Vershbow, then the NATO Deputy Secretary, also reaffirmed 
the importance of pursuing missile defence. In a speech on September 27, 2012, he 
explained, “Missile defence is a key issue for NATO. As a security and defence Alliance, 
we have an iron-clad duty to defend our people and our territory. We are committed to 
working together not only to deal with current threats, but also to plan for dealing with 
future threats.”136 This is a significant statement because it reaffirmed the mission agreed 
in 2010 by the NATO Allies at the Lisbon Summit. The Allies confirmed at that summit 
that missile defense is a mission for NATO, and that the NATO Allies have important roles 
to play in the protection of Europe as a whole.  
D. AMERICAN VIEWS ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE 
American officials, including President Obama, have stood behind their decision 
that the EPAA was the right choice for both Europe and the United States. President Obama 
explained the benefit of the system by saying, “To put it simply, our new missile defense 
architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American 
forces and America’s allies.”137 This shows that he stands behind his plan as the correct 
move for America and its allies. In 2010, the Department of Defense released its 
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assessment of the threats to the United States and its Canadian and European Allies in the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). This review acknowledged that the United 
States and its allies understand that they not only view threats differently but that they also 
are able to support their collective defense in different ways.  
This is further supported by President Obama’s letter to Senate Leadership on 
December 18, 2010, which states, “My administration plans to deploy all four phases of 
the EPAA. While advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the 
details or timing of the later phases of the EPAA—one reason this approach is called 
‘adaptive’—I will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four 
phases.”138 The adaptive portion of the policy articulated in the letter shows that the plan 
is not stagnant. The United States is able to adjust the plan as necessary in order to counter 
threats both presently and in the future. This also implies that developments could lead to 
decisions to adjust the final plan from what was originally proposed, as seen with the 
cancellation of Phase 4 in March 2013.  
Phase 4 was canceled in March 2013 after the United States concluded that the first 
three phases were sufficient for protection of both the European Allies and the United 
States. Chuck Hagel, then the Secretary of Defense, announced the cancellation of the 
fourth phase of the EPAA due to the restructuring of the program, which was guided by 
the administration. The administration decided it was time to shift the focus to threats that 
were emerging more quickly than Iran. He said, “Let me emphasize the strong and 
continued commitment of the United States to NATO missile defense. That commitment 
remains ironclad. The missile deployments the United States is making in phases one 
through three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including sites in Poland and 
Romania, will be able to provide coverage of all European NATO territory as planned by 
2018.”139 In other words, the administration decided that the three phases in place are 
sufficient to protect Europe from the current threats. Some Europeans have expressed 
concerns as to whether these phases will provide enough coverage to protect Europe from 
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future threats or whether the United States is isolating itself more in order to focus on 
protection of its own territory.  
E. ANALYSIS 
With the growing security concerns, deterrence has become a major aspect of 
policies throughout the United States and other NATO nations. Challenges have been 
identified in regard to budget constraints, technical challenges, and threat assessments. Are 
these challenges too great to be overcome? Based on the analysis it appears that they will 
not completely stop the program or prevent it from providing at least some protection and 
security. The extent of the protection gained is still to be seen.  
The new U.S. administration that took office in January 2017 may change the 
dynamics of the EPAA and missile defense in general. Moreover, the NATO Allies now 
face a more complicated situation than they did when the EPAA was launched in 2009.  
Russia remains a major player and complication to the complete implementation of 
the EPAA program. Arguably the Russians constitute a major reason why the United States 
did not follow through with its original objectives as briefed by President Obama in 
September 2009. Russian issues are covered in more detail in Chapter IV. The dialogue 
with Russia has proven to be important and remains a continuing complicated factor.  
The Russians do not support the Alliance’s pursuit of missile defense in Europe. 
This is a change from policy statements in 2009. President Dmitry Medvedev visited the 
United States in September 2009 after the EPAA program was announced. He spoke to the 
media following his talks with President Obama as follows: “We talked about missile 
defense with my colleague, President Obama. We talked that the decision that he took was 
reasonable and that reflected the position of the current U.S. administration on missile 
defense and also takes into consideration our concerns on the missile defense which is 
needed for Europe and for the world. And we are ready to continue this work with our U.S. 
colleagues in this direction, as well as with our European colleagues, of course.”140 This 
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statement expressed Russia’s original acceptance of the EPAA, but Moscow’s opinion 
shifted as Russia started to feel threatened. The Russians have for several years argued that 
the EPAA program and the Alliance missile defense efforts should not continue because 
they think that the program threatens Russia’s strategic deterrence and upholds American 
global ambitions. The effects of Russian opinion on the original objectives of the EPAA 
are explored in the next chapter. In the end, the concerns expressed by Russia seem to have 
contributed to the cancellation of Phase 4 of the EPAA. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Overall budget constraints, technology deficiencies, and opinion in some quarters 
of Europe and the American administration appear to have influenced the implementation 
of the EPAA system since the original objectives were laid out by President Obama in 
September 2009. These factors also seemed to affect the national and collective 
contributions to the program. Overall, the program is still proceeding, but it is not being 
implemented in the way that was originally stated in 2009. At this writing, in January 2018, 





IV. RUSSIAN RESPONSES TO U.S. AND ALLIED MISSILE 
DEFENSE 
This chapter explores the relationship between Russia and the NATO Allies in 
regard to the Alliance missile defense posture. More specifically, how have the responses 
of Russia shaped the Alliance missile defense posture and conclusively affected the U.S. 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)? 
A. BACKGROUND ON RUSSIAN MISSILE POLICY 
Russia’s missile policy is highly centered around politics, the glue that holds the 
regime together and allows the President to keep Russia running. Politics therefore also 
affect Russia’s missile defense policy. Mikhail Tsypkin explains this connection as 
follows: “The Russian political and media space has been populated, since the early 1990s, 
by fears that Russia may somehow lose its nuclear weapons. Such concerns have ranged 
from superficially rational worse-case scenarios of an American first strike all the way to 
conspiracy theories.”141 This is significant because this fear has caused a reaction in Russia 
to seemingly small things that other countries, including the United States, would find 
minor. This is an important aspect to understand because it sheds some light on Russia’s 
views regarding NATO and specifically missile defense in Europe. This idea will be 
elaborated on later in the chapter.  
Another dominant aspect of Russian foreign policy has been historically centered 
around the military exaggerating the Western threat. This can be traced back to the Soviet 
era, and it has continued to grow since the United States withdrew from the ABM 
Treaty.142 Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held an 
important role in interpreting the developments of U.S. missile defense; however, with less 
emphasis now on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military’s role in interpretation has 
grown, as was seen in the Soviet era.143 A return to the worst-case scenario idea is highly 
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likely as a result.144 This is significant because politics and state-controlled influenced 
media play such huge roles in the day-to-day activity in Russia. Policy is developed by the 
President, who could be influenced by these military assertions. The worst-case scenario 
only further helps President Putin, especially with an upcoming election, because it allows 
him to use fear to influence the Russian population. He is able to raise fears of the threat 
and then use it to his advantage by showing the people why they need him to protect them 
from the West. One can expect this tactic of provoking fear to continue to grow in 
prominence as the election draws closer.  
Another aspect of the Kremlin’s policy-making is centered on the views of the elites 
in Russia. Russian history has centered back and forth between the acceptance of its Soviet 
past and how to deal with its identity as a country and as a people. Mikhail Tsypkin’s article 
looks at this pendulum effect between the struggle to decide which pieces of their past 
should be accepted, especially under the Putin era, and what pieces should be 
eliminated.145 This is specifically true for Putin, who has not tried to eliminate private 
property or to isolate Russia from the world, but who has used its leverage in the former 
Soviet states to reduce U.S. and Western influences that had developed in the region.146 
This is important because by eliminating the influence of other countries Russia’s leaders 
are strengthening their own influence and enhancing their own legitimacy domestically. 
Russians view the strengthening of U.S. or NATO influence as the further isolation of 
Russia from Europe, which they are trying to avoid.147 Russia needs to prevent this from 
happening in order to continue its self-perception as a super power.  
B. HISTORY OF RUSSIA, NATO, AND U.S. INTERACTION 
1. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and the 
United States in 1972 as a means to prevent an arms race escalation. They aimed to prevent 
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this escalation by limiting the number of interceptors and defense sites. In 1972, they 
agreed to a defense of two sites with 200 missile interceptors.148 These numbers were later 
amended in 1974 to even stricter requirements of one defense site and 100 missile 
interceptors.149 The ABM Treaty remained in place for about 30 years before the United 
States chose to withdraw from the treaty.  
In December 2001, President Bush expressed the U.S. intention to withdraw from 
the treaty, which would take effect six months later.150 He believed that the threats 
concerning national security since the Cold War had changed and that the United States 
needed to adapt to them.151 President Bush believed that remaining in the treaty allowed 
rogue states and terrorists to develop long-range ballistic missiles and threaten the United 
States, which could not defend itself while remaining in the treaty.152 He also believed that 
the treaty stopped the United States from developing missile defense systems with its 
friends and allies.153 The U.S. withdrawal from the treaty had lasting consequences. 
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the treaty created tensions between Russia and 
the United States that have yet to abate. Both Russia and China immediately protested the 
U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.154 Russia began threatening to build a new nuclear 
weapon that would be capable of evading interceptors, and China began to threaten that it 
would begin adding more weapons to its nuclear arsenal.155 This withdrawal seemed to 
reinforce Russia’s already present fears of U.S. global ambition and the threat to Russia’s 
strategic deterrence posture. Both of these fears are elaborated on in greater detail in later 
sections of this chapter.  
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2. Lisbon Summit (November 2010) 
The Lisbon Summit was held in November 2010 in order to plan the future of 
NATO. The Lisbon Summit Declaration declared, “We reaffirm our commitment to the 
common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty, and to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.”156 This summit declaration 
also announced the adoption of a new Strategic Concept that not only opened up dialogue 
with Russia regarding cooperation and common interests but also announced a decision to 
pursue a NATO missile defense capability that would protect Europe.157 Russia was also 
invited to work jointly on the missile defense capability.158 This summit was the first of 
two important summits that attempted to open dialogue and create a more positive NATO-
Russia relationship.  
This summit had two outcomes that continued in the NATO-Russia relationship 
after the summit. In the words of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Joint Statement, “We 
agreed to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic 
missile threat assessment and to continue dialogue in this area. The NRC will also resume 
Theatre Missile Defence Cooperation. We have tasked the NRC to develop a 
comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence 
cooperation.”159 This summit opened up further dialogue at the Chicago Summit and also 
stimulated debate regarding the NATO missile defense capability.  
In 2010, both NATO and Russia were eager to offer ideas for joint cooperation on 
missile defense. Dmitry Medvedev, who was the president of Russia at the time, proposed 
“building a sector-based missile defence system.”160 Roberto Zadra has explained that this 
system would have divided the responsibilities of defense into sectors, with Russia being 
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responsible for ballistic missile defense of the Baltic states, among other territory.161 The 
people living in the NATO states that would be protected by Russia were not happy with 
this proposal. They instead preferred Article 5 protection that would be provided by the 
Alliance.162 Uncertainty was justified in the former Soviet republics that would have had 
to rely on Russia having their best interests at heart. They would have had to trust that 
Russia would actually choose to defend those territories. The concern was not something 
that could be overcome, and this sector approach did not come to fruition. Other plans, 
however, were suggested prior to the next summit in 2012.  
In 2011, Russia proposed another idea for a joint system. The deputy chief of the 
Russian General Staff at that time, Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, proposed that the 
joint system “should include joint centers for establishing threats and be based on joint 
decisions.”163 Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO at the time, continued this 
thought on a joint system by stating that, “Each side will have its own button to launch 
operative [missile] systems, but decisions on their application should be made jointly.”164 
Rogozin appears to have been referring to a system that would have some type of sectorial 
approach. This sectorial approach, though suggested again by Moscow, did not come to 
fruition. Further discussions regarding a joint system continued when Russia and NATO 
returned to the table in 2012 for the Chicago Summit.  
3. Chicago Summit (May 2012) 
The Chicago Summit, held in May 2012, reaffirmed the Strategic Concept that had 
been promulgated at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.165 It placed a continued emphasis on joint 
cooperation with Russia regarding common security interests, including the development 
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of a joint missile defense system.166 This is significant because both sides as this time were 
still willing and eager to cooperate and work together. Two proposals were put forth at the 
summit regarding joint cooperation on missile defense. First, there was a proposal to jointly 
develop a Missile Defense Data Fusion Centre, which would also include a Planning 
Operations Centre.167 Russia after the summit told the Alliance that it was unable at the 
time to consider this first proposal.168 The second proposal was “to develop a transparency 
regime based upon a regular exchange of information about the current respective missile 
defence capabilities of NATO and Russia.”169 This proposal, like the first, was also 
abandoned because Washington and Moscow could not come to a consensus.170 This is 
significant because it showed an increased tension that had developed since the summit in 
2010.  
The Chicago summit also developed some issues regarding agreements that had 
come out of the Lisbon Summit. At the Lisbon Summit they had agreed to “resume theatre 
missile defense cooperation and to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future 
framework for missile defence cooperation.”171 The first of these plans came almost to a 
stop because it had been limited to a March 2012 exercise in Germany that had been based 
on gathering lessons from a theatre-missile-defense exercise that had been run from a 
computer.172 Russia believed that this exercise was enough to show the advantage of 
having a joint system while the Alliance believed that such conclusions could not be drawn 
from just one exercise.173 This is significant because it showed hesitation on the part of 
the Alliance, which was not as prevalent at the Lisbon summit.  
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The second proposal from the Lisbon Summit—the comprehensive Joint 
Analysis—had also come to a standstill, despite multiple revisions of the document, 
because of an inability to come to a consensus on the final draft of the document.174 This 
reflected the tensions developing on both sides. It also showed that developing a joint 
system would be more complicated than NATO and Russia had originally thought. Part of 
the issue with coming to a consensus concerned the role that each side would play in the 
system and whether a truly cooperative split arrangement would be politically feasible or 
even technically possible. During this discussion Russia also began raising its concerns 
regarding the EPAA system and the implications for Russia. These tensions and 
disagreements regarding missile defense and intentions have only increased since the 2012 
summit. In the end, the optimism about being able to work together on missile defense 
cooperation ended completely in 2014.  
4. NATO–Russia Missile Defense Cooperation Suspended (April 2014) 
The NATO-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation was suspended in April 2014 due 
to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and ultimate annexation of Crimea. At this time NATO 
released a statement: “We, the Foreign Ministers of NATO, are united in our condemnation 
of Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. We do not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate 
attempt to annex Crimea.”175 While this was the official end to the cooperation, the 
problems between NATO and Russia had led to a standstill in the cooperation that can be 
traced back to the Chicago Summit in 2012.  
In October 2013, just before the Ukraine Crisis, Russia had voiced concern over its 
voice not being heard in regard to joint cooperation. Sergi Shoigu, the Russian Defense 
Minister, said, “We have failed to work jointly on this issue. The European missile defense 
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programs are developing, and our [Russia’s] concerns are not being taken into account.”176 
This concern has recurred not only in regard to a joint system but also in regard to the 
EPAA system. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary-General from 2009 through 
2014, said: “It is no secret that we have not yet found the way to work together [in this 
area]. But Ministerial Discussions are valuable in addressing existing concerns, and we 
need to continue to engage frankly and directly to overcome our difference.”177 These 
quotations from both sides show the standstill on cooperation that had already developed 
prior to Russia’s actions in Crimea. Russia’s actions just solidified the final decision over 
approaches that had already developed. The disagreements only worsened after the joint 
cooperation dissolved. The discord over Russia’s intervention in Ukraine opened up space 
for Russia to voice other concerns specifically regarding the EPAA system.  
C. RUSSIAN ARGUMENT ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE  
Moscow has opposed the U.S. EPAA system and the larger Alliance missile 
defense effort because the Russians believe that such capabilities threaten their strategic 
deterrence. Initially they had welcomed the plan because they thought it would be a positive 
step away from the plan that had been in place under President Bush.178 The disagreement 
resulted when Russia realized that this plan would take place in steps and that it would 
involve stationing equipment in Eastern Europe, which Russia believed was too close to 
its own borders.179 Roberto Zadra in his article “NATO, Russia, and Missile Defence,” 
argues that the key concern of Moscow through the years has been fear of missile defense 
in and for Europe and North America undermining the Russian strategic deterrent.180 This 
view was evident with the George W. Bush administration’s proposed missile defense as 
well as with the Obama administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach. The United 
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States and NATO rejected this Russian claim by pointing out that interceptors placed in 
Poland would be unable to catch Russian ICBMs because it would result in a tail chase.181 
Russian officials and some academic observers have claimed that a ground-based 
interceptor with a burnout velocity of about 5 km/sec would be able to intercept Russian 
ICBMs.182 The concerns expressed by Russia appear to have resonated with the United 
States because Phase 4 of the EPAA, which would have had a burnout velocity above the 
5km/sec threshold, was canceled in March 2013.  
Mikhail Tsypkin has further explained this argument and counterargument by 
elucidating Russia’s rationale in arguing that European missile defense could cause 
strategic instability. In his words, “They argue that the presence of American missile 
defence in Europe would result in a relationship of strategic instability between the two 
largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia.”183 The Russians believe this because 
in their view the presence of U.S. and NATO missiles and missile defenses in Europe could 
give the United States the power to threaten Russia in some circumstances, which would 
create instability.  
Prior to the cancellation of Phase 4 of the EPAA in March 2013, the United States 
considered offering classified data as a means to continue dialogue and interest Russia in 
participating in the joint missile defense effort.184 One piece of information that they 
reportedly considered sharing with the Russians was the burnout velocity of the 
interceptors that were being placed in Eastern Europe.185 Since the Russians believed that 
these missiles posed a threat to their strategic deterrent, this information could have been 
valuable to Russia and might have contributed to easing their concerns regarding missile 
defense. However, while assuaging Russian fears, it could also compromise the interceptor 
                                                 
181 Ibid., 53 
182 Ibid. 
183 Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defence,” 781. 
184 Jim Wolf, and Editing by Todd Eastham, “Exclusive: U.S. dangles secret data for Russia missile 





by allowing Russia to develop technology that would be capable of countering or defeating 
the missiles.186 Additionally it opens up the risk that Russia could give or sell the 
information to other countries, placing the Alliance and the system at even greater risk.187 
This information in the wrong hands could have dire consequences for the defense of 
Europe and the Alliance members. Ultimately, despite the United States being willing to 
consider possibly giving Russia classified data, it was not enough to assuage Moscow’s 
fears, which continue over the EPAA system in Europe.  
D. RUSSIAN ARGUMENT ON U.S. GLOBAL AMBITION 
The second concern for the Russians has derived from what they have assessed as 
American global ambitions and strategic superiority. This concern has centered on the idea 
that United States missile defense assets in Europe and the Asia-Pacific constitute 
components of a global system.188 Roberto Zadra states that Russia sees the deployment 
of U.S. missile defense assets in both Europe and Asia as a threat to the strategic deterrence 
of all of Russia rather than just the European portion of the country.189 The Russians assert 
that the global U.S. system adds a level of capability affecting not only Russia but also 
China, Iran, and North Korea. The U.S. missile defense system does not prevent Russia 
and other countries from using their assets, but it does add the benefit of a small amount of 
deterrence by denial capability that could be needed in some contingencies—for instance, 
countering small, accidental, or unauthorized attacks. 
Russia, however, fears a global system due to the number of interceptors that would 
hypothetically be possible. Tsypkin’s analysis provides some insight into this: “Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the ten interceptors would present no threat to Russia, 
but that the Kremlin was concerned about the probability of a future global US BMD 
system with ‘hundreds or even thousands’ of interceptors not limited by any guarantee on 
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the part of the US.”190 This quotation referred to the ten interceptors being placed in Poland 
as part of the NATO missile defense architecture envisaged during the George W. Bush 
administration. Some Russians argue that the United States could blackmail Russia by 
making it vulnerable to not only a first strike capability but also to the U.S. defense system 
being able to intercept any missiles that would come from Russia in retaliation.191 This 
vulnerability relates to Russian fears that have become prominent in the country’s decisions 
and policies. The Russians tend to look at the worst-case scenario as the most plausible 
one.  
E. NATO RESPONSE TO RUSSIA AND JOINT MISSILE DEFENCE 
While some of the NATO Allies believed that Russia still posed a threat, Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen suggested in 2010 that Russia could play a role in collective defense in 
some circumstances. In his view, Iran’s improvements in ballistic missiles remain a threat 
to Europe, which includes Russia, and failure to act regarding Iran with a “vigorous 
response” could endanger European security. 192 Regarding the threat that the Allies face 
as the same threat that Russia also faces, Rasmussen’s vision was based on the idea of “one 
security roof that protects us all” which—he declared in 2010—should extend “from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok.”193 This idea holds that the NATO Allies and Russia face the 
same threat, Iran, and should be working together to ensure the safety of everyone in range 
of Iranian missiles. 
While the idea of a cooperative partnership concerning missile defense between 
NATO and Russia is pleasant, it is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future due to the past 
and current relationships and priorities of both sides. Richard Weitz argued that it would 
not be possible to have a successful NATO-Russia collaboration on combined missile 
defense. “Some US and NATO analysts saw Russia’s confrontational posture as an attempt 
                                                 
190 Tsypkin, “Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defence,” 795. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Promise of Euro-Atlantic Missile Defense by Anders Fogh 




to bargain for much greater influence in any European missile-defence architecture than 
Western governments would like to provide.”194 This idea is supported by Russian General 
Yury Baluyevskiy: “The issue should be clarified, whether the missile defense system in 
Europe will be developed jointly with Russia, or whether it will be a segment of the U.S. 
national system without Russia’s participation.”195 In other words, NATO-Russian 
collaboration on missile defense is unlikely due to both sides being unwilling to set aside 
their differences for a common security goal.  
F. U.S. RESPONSE TO COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENCE 
The George W. Bush administration also believed that cooperation in the program 
could be extended beyond the European Allies to Russia. The idea of joint cooperation in 
missile defense was expressed on May 24, 2002.196 The White House released a press 
statement explaining this agreement: “The United States and Russia also agreed to study 
possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises 
related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research 
and development of missile defense technologies.”197  
This agreement was significant because it led to the discussions regarding joint 
missile defense at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits, as well as a joint exercise between 
NATO and Russia in 2012. The idea of joint missile defense cooperation continued for the 
United States during the Obama Administration. In the words of the 2010 Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review Report, “One of the benefits of the European Phased Adaptive Approach 
is that it allows for a Russian contribution if political circumstances make that possible. 
For example, Russian radars could contribute useful and welcome tracking data, although 
the functioning of the U.S. system will not be dependent on that data.”198 However, 
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pursuing this option is highly unlikely due to Russia’s requirements to participate in a joint 
architecture and the complicated relationship between the United States and Russia. 
Furthermore, this document stated, “The United States will work more intensively with 
allies and partners to provide pragmatic and cost-effective capacity. The United States will 
also continue in its efforts to establish a cooperative BMD relationship with Russia.”199 
This shows that the United States was willing to bring Russia into the program and to work 
on an agenda for constructive cooperation. 
G. NATO–RUSSIAN JOINT MISSILE DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION 
In summary, a joint missile defense component with Russia has been proposed but 
rejected due to Russia, the European Allies, and the United States being unable to reach a 
consensus and compromise on a joint system. Specifically, NATO nations have recognized 
the importance of Russia and the potential value of its contributions. Both sides have met 
on multiple occasions, including the Chicago and Lisbon summits, but they have been 
unable to reach conclusions that would suit the interests of both Moscow and Washington. 
Ultimately, Russia’s concerns about the Alliance missile defense posture and the 
interactions with NATO and America appear to have resonated with the United States 
because the original objectives of the EPAA were modified. The U.S. decision to cancel 
Phase 4 in March 2013 was significant because Phase 4 would have provided protection to 
the United States against ICBMs. 
A feasible joint missile defense system would require work on both sides. 
Specifically they would need to both compromise in regard to what each side holds 
important for a joint system.200 One difficulty that would require compromise concerns 
missile interceptors in Central and Eastern Europe.201 Russia sees these interceptors as a 
threat to its own strategic deterrence posture. For NATO, on the other hand, losing these 
interceptors would make the Allies vulnerable to the threats perceived from countries like 
Iran. The necessity for compromises makes this a tricky and difficult situation. On the 
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Russian side, any compromise to a joint system would have ramifications in domestic 
politics. Compromise could make Russia appear weak, which Putin and his colleagues do 
not want, since they consider Russia equal to the United States.  
H. ANALYSIS 
Russia has its own concerns regarding Alliance missile defense just as NATO has 
its own concerns. Russia sees the system as a threat to its own strategic deterrent, while 
NATO is concerned with keeping up with current threats. One argument that has surfaced 
is that the United States cancellation of Phase 4 of the EPAA was meant to settle some of 
Russia’s fears regarding threats to its strategic deterrence. Technical analyses show, 
however, that the missiles that would have been deployed during this phase would have 
resulted in the tail chase of a Russian ICBM. Therefore, Russia’s concerns were unfounded. 
The other argument is that Phase 4 was canceled due to a reprioritization of the budget. 
This reprioritization was justified based on reassessments of the 2010 BMDR. In March 
2013, the United States found that Iranian missile threats were not developing as quickly 
as was originally anticipated and therefore the money that had been set aside for that phase 
could be better used elsewhere—namely, defense against North Korean missiles.  
The other large debate is whether NATO and Russia could eventually come to a 
consensus on how to work together towards cooperative missile defense. Prior to 2014, 
both sides seemed willing to work together to develop a system that would benefit Europe 
as a whole. However, it appears that two factors—(a) unreasonable fears on the part of 
Russia regarding America’s intentions and (b) Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the 
annexation of Crimea)—have made this an issue that will not be solved in the near future. 
A step towards this would require the reinitiating of talks, with both sides coming to the 
table with a willingness to work together. This does not seem to be a plausible option until 
after the next Presidential election in Russia—if then. President Putin appears to be using 
his concerns about Alliance missile defense as an advantage for his campaign. By playing 
on the fears that have remained present in Russia since the Cold War, he is able to use the 
fears of a missile attack or a threat to Russia’s own strategic deterrence systems as an 
advantage to his campaign. He presents himself as the protector of Russia who must be 
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reelected. Overall, it appears that the original objectives of the EPAA were modified as a 
result of many factors and not purely as the result of a specific interaction between Russia 
and NATO or Moscow and Washington.  
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the Alliance missile defense posture with regard to the 
NATO Allies and Russia. Russia’s response has been shaped by its fear regarding the U.S. 
contributions to the Alliance missile defense posture. The EPAA has raised issues for 
Russia with regard to threatening Russia’s strategic deterrence and what the Russians 
perceive as U.S. global ambitions. Overall, these concerns appear likely to persist in the 
foreseeable future.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States and NATO as a whole have a vested interest in missile defense 
to protect the populations, territories, and forces of the Alliance. The European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) instituted under the Obama Administration in 2009 addresses 
the interests of all NATO nations, including the United States. While this capability is 
reassuring for the United States and its Allies, it causes concern for Russia. This has 
complicated planning and implementing Allied missile defense, and also has led in some 
cases to tense interactions with Russia about its concerns. This chapter is composed of 
three sections. The first section summarizes Chapters II through IV. The second section 
analyzes the interactions regarding missile defense involving the United States, the NATO 
Allies, and Russia. The final section provides recommendations.  
A. SUMMARY 
1. Chapter II 
Chapter II examined the history of ballistic missile defense as well as the 
development of the EPAA. The history of ballistic missile defense has had a profound 
impact on the development and shaping of the current Alliance missile defense posture and 
the original objectives set out by the Obama administration for the EPAA. The necessity 
for missile defense grew out of the development of German missiles during World War II 
and NATO’s 1949 Strategic Concept. The rise of missile threats from the Soviet Union and 
China caused even more emphasis to be put on missile defense.  
Through the years, the program was reoriented many times in response to new 
technologies and threats. The United States and the Soviet Union participated in various 
talks and in 1972 signed the ABM Treaty, which set restrictions on U.S. and Soviet ABM 
systems and missile defense sites. In 2001, the United States announced its plan to 
withdraw from the treaty, a decision which eventually added tension to the U.S.-Russia 
relationship. These tensions increased with Russia’s negative reactions to NATO’s 
decisions at the Lisbon and Chicago summits. In 2009–2010, the United States conducted 
a Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that enabled Washington to get a better gauge 
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on the current and future challenges. This led to an eventual reorientation of the EPAA, 
with a shift from the original objectives that had been laid out in 2009.  
On September 17, 2009, President Obama announced the beginning of the EPAA, 
which was aimed at countering current and future threats from Iran. It was designed to be 
implemented in four phases and allowed adaptability and interoperability with non-NATO 
countries. Phase 1 of the system commenced in March 2011 and Phase 4 had a planned 
completion date of 2022. However, Phase 4 was canceled in March 2013 prior to its 
commencement.  
2. Chapter III 
Chapter III examined the NATO response to the EPAA. More specifically, it 
reviewed critiques of the system such as costs, technology challenges, and American views 
of European collective defense efforts. The budget critique considered reservations about 
contributions by the Allies, including the United States. One aspect of the budget argument 
is that the European Allies are generally more financially constrained then the United States 
and therefore unable to contribute on the same level. They have instead contributed in other 
ways.  
The technology challenge critique included target acquisition, discrimination, 
interception, and data networking. Target acquisition is a challenge because the radar 
system used in the program may not be robust enough to adequately monitor all of the 
Alliance territory. Target discrimination is a challenge because of the short time frame 
available to adequately discern the threat from decoys. Interception requires a kill vehicle 
that can actually neutralize the threat. Finally, data networking proves challenging due to 
the need to efficiently fuse all of the relevant data.  
The alliance response has been complex due to varying opinions throughout the 
Alliance. Some countries have shown opposition to the U.S. missile defense system in 
Europe, while others have expressed support for the Alliance having such a system. Some 
Allies have openly agreed to participate in the collective defense but have done little to 
provide for the system itself beyond contributing to the ALTBMD network. Others are 
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concerned about the vulnerabilities that still remain. In the end, the general consensus is 
that some coverage is better than none.  
The American perspective has centered on the idea that the system is the right 
choice for both the United States and its Allies. The Americans have noted that the program 
is adaptive and capable of modification to counter emerging threats. The U.S. has faced 
challenges leading to a restructuring of the program in relation to the original objectives 
that had been set out in 2009. Despite restructuring, the Obama Administration held that 
the system would still be capable of accomplishing the defense of Europe that was 
originally promised in September 2009.  
3. Chapter IV 
Chapter IV analyzed the relationship between Russia and the NATO Allies 
regarding the Alliance missile defense posture. It more specifically considered how these 
relationships and interactions affected the U.S. EPAA. Russian policy has centered since 
the 1990s on concerns about the West and how they could impact Russia’s security. Putin 
in particular has exploited these concerns to his advantage, not only to gain power and 
influence in Russia but also to keep it. Definitively Russia aims at continuing its self-
perception as a super power.  
Proponents of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty hoped that it would help to 
prevent an arms race escalation with the Soviet Union, but Soviet ICBM and SLBM 
programs in the 1970s substantially exceeded U.S. expectations. Ultimately, the U.S. 
choosing to withdraw from the treaty had lasting effects on Russia. According to Russian 
observers, the largest impact was a reinforcement of Russia’s fears concerning threats to 
its own strategic deterrence posture as well as concern about the United States having 
global ambitions.  
The Lisbon summit allowed NATO to adopt its new Strategic Concept while also 
opening up dialogue with Russia. Russia and NATO attempted to come to a consensus on 
missile defense cooperation, an effort that failed and led to further tensions between them. 
The prospect of working together on missile defense ended indefinitely in 2014 due to 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea.  
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Russia opposed the EPAA system as well as the larger U.S.-led missile defense 
program because, the Russians asserted, the system threatened their own strategic 
deterrence. It caused disagreements between Washington and Moscow due to the United 
States and the other NATO Allies rejecting Russia’s claims. Ultimately, Russia’s concerns 
seemed to have some impact due to the United States canceling Phase 4 of the EPAA, the 
phase of greatest concern to Moscow.  
Russia also opposed the U.S.-led missile defense system because, the Russians 
contended, the system further proved the accuracy of their assessment of American global 
ambitions. They argued that the combination of the system in Europe and the U.S. presence 
in the Asia-Pacific proved this. This argument proved to have many shortcomings.  
Despite the Moscow-Washington disagreements the program, the United States and 
its NATO Allies still believed that there was room not only for dialogue but also for 
cooperation with Russia on a joint system that would benefit all of the parties. A joint 
system involving NATO about and Russia would require all parties to set aside their 
differences and work together for a common goal.  
B. ANALYSIS 
1. NATO Considerations 
Despite the reservations that are present in NATO, the Allies have become 
increasingly aware of the importance of deterrence, especially as their security concerns 
have mounted. With elements of the EPAA system operational in Europe, concerns such 
as public opinion now appear more muted. However, other concerns remain genuine, 
especially those concerning budget and technical challenges.  
The budget concerns were prevalent after the announcement of the EPAA and have 
only become more important through the years regarding countries pulling their own 
weight not only with the Alliance missile defense posture but also in NATO in general. 
Steven Hildreth and Carl Ek explained that costs to improve the existing ALTBMD 
program in addition to the territorial defense portion of the new system would cost the 
Alliance over 800 million euros (approximately $1 billion) over the timeframe of 14 
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years.202 This is a significant expense, especially if the European Allies and the United 
States remain cash strapped.203 The shortage of funds could hinder completing the plans 
that have already been put in motion as well as other potential complications (such as 
technology developments or threat challenges). The program may have scope for 
adaptability, but that does not mean that the budget does as well.  
Its adaptability has been both a strength and a weakness. Its strength lies in the 
technical ability to modify equipment as necessary to provide an effective system. Its 
weakness resides in the option to abandon aspects of the program, such as Phase 4. The 
deletion from the original plan has had a ripple effect because some NATO observers have 
expressed doubts about the reliability of the United States. The NATO missile defense 
posture will continue to change as the priorities and threats for the Alliance evolve. 
Redefined priorities may emerge in the near future when the Trump Administration 
releases its new Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The 2010 BMDR provided 
invaluable insights concerning the Obama Administration’s assessments of threats and 
allowed for the reprioritization of the program. It can be assumed that insights presented in 
the forthcoming new report may do the same. The new BMDR may change the 
implementation of the current program or call for completely new elements in the program 
or an entirely new program.  
The new administration in the United States may revise the policy from its original 
objectives and deadlines. In 2010, NATO decided to expand its BMD program largely 
because the United States agreed to provide most of the required equipment (including 
sensors and interceptors).204 With the provided equipment in place, the NATO Allies could 
be protected, at least against small attacks. Today critics argue that more of the burden 
should be carried by Allies other than the United States. The future of the Alliance missile 
defense program may depend on whether other NATO members make greater 
contributions.  
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Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis traveled to NATO HQ in February 2017 to talk 
with the Allies regarding their contributions. While in Brussels Secretary Mattis said, “No 
longer can the American taxpayer carry a disproportionate share of the defense of western 
values. Americans cannot care more for your children’s security than you do.”205 This 
statement gives perspective on the Trump Administration’s views on contributions by the 
NATO Allies. It remains to be seen whether the EPAA program will continue as planned 
or be revised to fit the new American threat assessments or a shift in priorities driven by 
burden-sharing debates in the Alliance. While the new administration may not be satisfied 
with the defense spending of the Allies, Washington may nonetheless continue pursuing 
the missile defense system in Europe due to its concern for the Americans that serve abroad 
and broader U.S. interests.  
Technical issues remain an important challenge to the originally proposed U.S. 
EPAA as well as the overall larger Alliance posture. It has yet to be proven whether the 
original goals of the EPAA can be attained, owing to technical challenges. Some of these 
challenges will only be identified and mastered over time as the program continues and 
more parts of the system become fully operational. Some analysts argue that certain 
concerns may never be addressed if the system never has to be used against an actual threat. 
Steven Whitmore and John R. Deni argue that the challenges cannot be overcome because 
of the prohibitive cost of actually surmounting them.206 Whether this criticism is valid 
remains to be seen. It will be hard to demonstrate success in target acquisition, target 
discrimination, interception, and data analysis. Technical issues and budget constraints will 
continue to influence the progress and execution of the EPAA system.  
2. Russian Considerations 
Russia’s concerns reflect its history. While Russia remains concerned that U.S.-led 
missile defenses in Europe and the Asia-Pacific threaten its strategic deterrence, these 
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concerns seem to be largely unfounded. The United States and its NATO Allies have 
stepped forward in good faith to assuage these fears over the years since the original 
announcement of the EPAA in September 2009. The United States has even gone as far as 
considering options for providing Russia with classified data regarding burnout velocities 
of the interceptors that were to be used in the system to assuage Moscow’s concerns.207 If 
the United States was intent on threatening Russia’s strategic deterrence, this option would 
not have even been raised as a possibility. If the United States had chosen this path, it 
would have increased the risk of Russia building an interceptor that could counter or defeat 
U.S. missiles or selling or transferring the information to a third party.208 Therefore all of 
this evidence points to an unfounded fear on the part of Russia with regard to the EPAA. 
This fear has also been shown to be unfounded by NATO’s wanting to work with 
Russia with regard to a cooperative missile defense system that would benefit both Russia 
and the NATO Alliance. NATO and the United States have expressed the value they see 
in working with Russia on such a system. In 2010, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then the 
NATO Secretary General, went so far as to suggest “one security roof that protects us all 
from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”209 This is significant because it assumes that NATO and 
Russia face the same threats from Iran and North Korea. The idea of a NATO-Russia effort 
to develop a cooperative program sounds pleasant but remains highly unlikely. Richard 
Weitz argues that it is unlikely due to mutual mistrust regarding the other side’s 
participation in such a system. “Some US and NATO analysts saw Russia’s confrontational 
posture as an attempt to bargain for much greater influence in any European missile-
defence architecture than Western governments would like to provide.”210  
This view is supported by the Russian side as well. The possibility of cooperation 
has become even more distant since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. With the NATO-
Russia relationship even more strained, Russia appears to be less likely to compromise on 
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such a system. It would also have ramifications in Russia’s domestic politics, especially 
for Putin, as he desires to remain in power. It remains to be seen how the new Trump 
administration will interact with Russia and the NATO Allies regarding missile defense in 
Europe.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings shed light on the complex missile defense challenges that faced the 
United States, NATO, and Russia throughout the Obama administration. While the EPAA 
did not fulfill the original objectives that were proposed in September 2009 (notably 
because of the cancellation of Phase 4 in 2013), there is no clear cut answer as to the exact 
reasons why this occurred. Domestic and international factors as well as technical and 
budget challenges for the United States appear to be the most important determinants.  
Pending the release of the 2018 BMDR, there is room for further reflection on what 
ramifications it may hold for the continuation of the current program, since it may move 
into a completely new direction. There is also further room to investigate other aspects of 
the relationship between the United States and Russia (and NATO and Russia) and to 
clarify what impact these relations have had in the past on cooperation. The new U.S. 
administration may open up a completely new era of research regarding missile defense 
and the NATO Alliance.  
D. FINAL REFLECTIONS 
The question that both NATO and Russia should ask is, how can their relationship 
be mended so that they can cooperate to overcome the real current and future threats that 
both sides will face? Given the importance of missile defense for the protection of territory 
and populations to both, it appears that it would be mutually beneficial for both sides to 
strive towards a better relationship. This will be complicated by Russia’s illegal actions in 
invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea, and by Russia’s desire to maintain the appearance 
of being a superpower, partly for domestic political reasons. Missile defense will continue 
to present challenges to both Russia and NATO. As noted previously, the new 
administration in the United States may change the original objectives of the EPAA 
program or redefine it fundamentally.  
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